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Engdahl has written an intellectually stimulating book that 
contains a number of interesting and useful ideas. At the same 
time, despite its own suggestions to the contrary, the book also ful-
fills the role of a more conventional Nutshell by providing helpful 
explanations of the evolution and modern status of various constitu-
tional doctrines. 
Engdahl's goal for his book, however, is more ambitious, for he 
attempts not only to describe, but also to defend, a scheme of judi-
cially enforced limitations on congressional power. Yet in the con-
text of federalism, no less than elsewhere, we need to know why the 
judiciary should be restricting the operation of the legislative pro-
cess. If the appeal is to the wisdom of the framers, we need to know 
whether their judgments are still wise in the 1980s, and, if not, why 
their intentions should nonetheless continue to control. If the ap-
peal is not so much to the framers as to functional considerations 
guiding the proper operation of our modern democracy, this func-
tional analysis must be set forth and defended. Engdahl makes no 
serious effort on either fronts As a result, his attempt to shore up 
the law of constitutional federalism is incomplete, and therefore un-
successful, because such an effort cannot succeed without a more 
persuasive theoretical foundation. 
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS. By David M. O'Brien.1 New York, N.Y.: 
W. W. Norton & Company. 1986. Pp. 384. Cloth, $18.95; 
Paper, $9.95. 
Jeffrey Brandon Morris z 
Professor David M. O'Brien has brought forth a readable but 
serious book about the Supreme Court, appropriate for adoption in 
undergraduate upper division courses, or as collateral reading in 
law school courses in constitutional law, or simply as an introduc-
tion to the Court for intelligent laymen. From the perspective of a 
8. Indeed. his argument that the judiciary should enforce significant limitations on the 
power of Congress seems at least somewhat at odds with his critique of the Supreme Court's 
dormant commerce clause doctrine. In the course of that critique, he contends that "when 
debatable choices must be made among competing public interests, or between public and 
competing private interests, one might well wonder whether they ought not be made through 
the political rather than the judicial process," and he adds that "interests locally disadvan-
taged do have political representation in Congress." 
I. Associate Professor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of 
Virginia. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. 
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seasoned political scientist, Professor O'Brien covers the process of 
appointing Justices, the institutional life of the Court, and the im-
plementation of its decisions. In a little over 300 pages, he refutes 
several familiar notions: that the Court should be apolitical; that 
the Justices are legal monks; that the Court is a collegial body; that 
it is primarily the Justices who write their opinions; that the denial 
of certiorari has no meaning; and that the Justices prize collective 
opinions more highly than those by individual Justices. While 
much of this will not come as a shock to the seasoned Court 
watcher, he or she, too, can benefit from insights developed by 
O'Brien in his service as a Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court, 
from interviews and correspondence with all the sitting members of 
the Court save Antonin Scalia, from considerable research into the 
unpublished papers of various Justices, and from the exploitation of 
such under-utilized resources as transcripts of oral argument. 
I 
While recogmzmg that the Supreme Court is a "temple of 
law," O'Brien also stresses that it is a "fundamentally political insti-
tution," that the Justices compete for influence and "the Court itself 
is locked in a larger struggle for power in society." He illustrates 
this in the first chapter with a discussion of Roe v. Wade, placing it 
in the context of the 1960s movement to liberalize abortion laws. 
O'Brien recreates the policy-making process within the Court on 
the basis of memoranda from the Brennan Papers in the Library of 
Congress. We see the pressures that Justice Blackmun was under 
from Justices Douglas and Brennan; why Blackmun sought re-argu-
ment; and the efforts-in retrospect appropriate-that Blackmun 
made at the time the opinion came down to insure accurate press 
coverage. 
Like any good political scientist, O'Brien is aware that a 
Supreme Court decision is often merely one stage in a long political 
struggle. Roe v. Wade, he tells us, "left numerous questions unan-
swered and afforded ample opportunities for thwarting the imple-
mentation of its mandate." O'Brien then briefly indicates the 
reactions of interest groups, scholars, and others. Little of this is 
surprising in a text on the Supreme Court, but O'Brien highlights 
his points with a nose for relevant and vivid facts that are useful 
even for the Court sophisticate. He goes, for example, to the Statis-
tical Abstract to learn that the number of illegal abortions declined 
from nearly 750,000 before Roe to an estimated 10,000 in 1980, 
while the number of legal abortions grew from 744,610 the year 
following the decision to over 1.5 million in 1981, and in 1982-83 
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there were an average of 426 abortions per 1000 live births. He also 
offers data from public opinion polls indicating that 46% favored 
the Roe decision and 45% opposed it, but that 60% oppose a con-
stitutional amendment to make abortions illegal. 
In his second chapter O'Brien forcefully debunks the myth that 
appointments to the Supreme Court should be made on the basis of 
merit. Not only is merit difficult to define, but it "competes with 
other political considerations like personal and ideological compati-
bility, with the forces of support or opposition in Congress and the 
White House, and with demands for representative appointments 
on the basis of geography, religion, race, gender, and ethnicity." 
The selection of a Justice is, as Harlan Fiske Stone put it, like a 
"lottery," and the verdict turns less on merit than on political visi-
bility, support, and circumstance. O'Brien makes this point tell-
ingly by referring to the appointment of Benjamin Cardozo, which 
has always been viewed as the quintessential triumph of merit. 
That it may have been, but it was also good politics: President Hoo-
ver had been badly embarrassed by the defeat of his nominee to 
succeed Edward Sanford in 1930, John J. Parker, and thus was 
searching for an appointee whose reputation was unimpeachable. 
O'Brien also knows that presidents are not completely free to 
pack the Court with political associates and ideological kin, for 
other political factors intervene, such as religion, geography, race, 
and gender. In the aftermath of the Bark-Ginsburg fiasco, many 
will agree with O'Brien's reminder that such "Court packing" de-
pends upon the state of presidential prestige and political expedi-
ency. Perhaps some of the unwise support for a constitutional 
amendment to limit federal judges and Justices to a fourteen-year 
term will not ebb. 
The core of the book is three chapters which, more reliably 
than any other work, portray life behind the velvet curtain. Focus-
ing upon the "process by which the Court establishes and maintains 
its internal procedures and norms and defines and differentiates its 
role from that of other political branches," O'Brien writes of the 
psychological interdependence of the Justices, their lack of political 
accountability, and the norms of secrecy, tradition, and collegiality. 
In separate works, both O'Brien and I have attempted to come 
to grips with the effects of changed staffing patterns upon the 
Court's decision-making process.J We are not far apart in our con-
3. J. Morris, Can the Supreme Court be Led? A Reevaluation of the Role of Chief 
Justices (Sept. 1986) (paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, D.C.). In revised form this discussion will appear in my forthcom-
ing book on the Office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
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elusions. O'Brien argues that the Court has become increasingly 
bureaucratic and that this has reinforced the traditional indepen-
dence of the Justices. I believe that he is the first scholar to capture 
the significance of the vast increase in the number of law clerks. His 
discussion of Law Clerks in the Chambers is the best guide I know 
to how clerks are being used by the Court. The clerks play an indis-
pensable role in deciding what to decide. Although he nowhere 
states this explicitly, he implies that the Justices themselves rarely 
read petitions for certiorari.4 O'Brien considers the expanded role 
of law clerks in screening cases "significant and problematic." He 
appears particularly concerned about the impact of the clerks upon 
the opening (September) conference of the term. Since the Justices 
only discuss in conference those petitions for certiorari which at 
least one Justice wants to discuss, and because the Justices discuss 
only one-fifth of the term's gate-keeping docket at the conference, 
perhaps sixteen percent of the work of the year is "screened out by 
law clerks and never collectively discussed and considered by the 
Justices." The clerks that do this screening ordinarily have been at 
the Court for less than three months. 
O'Brien says that the clerks-whose work also includes the 
preparation of bench memoranda, comments on the responses of 
the Justices to the draft opinions from their chambers, cite checking 
and proofreading-are, in most chambers, writing the first drafts of 
opinions of the Court. As the term draws to a close, the clerks 
assume an even greater role in opinion writing. 
O'Brien believes that the increase in the number of law clerks 
(from two per side judge in 1970 to four in 1976) has had a noticea-
ble effect on the Court: opinions are longer and more heavily foot-
noted and the number of concurring and dissenting opinions has 
steadily increased. He argues, as I have, that delegation of work to 
larger staffs has partially transformed the Justices' role from judicial 
to administrative, and diminished their collegiality as well. 
Although he acknowledges that institutional norms promote a 
shared conception of the role of the Court as a tribunal for resolving 
only issues of national importance, O'Brien sees the Justices com-
peting for influence in setting the Court's agenda. After examining 
Justice Brennan's docketbook for the 1973 Term, he states that the 
number of petitions unanimously granted had dropped from what it 
had been from 1947 to 1957 by half to less than 2%. Still, there was 
unanimity in most of the denials. O'Brien is particularly critical of 
the Court's refusal to explain why review is denied: "Although en-
abling the Court to manage its business, denials invite confusion 
4. Justice Brennan is an exception. 
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and suspicion " He is also critical of the increasing use of 
summary decisions. 
Turning to cases that are granted full review, O'Brien chal-
lenges the significance of the conference on the merits and associ-
ates its relative unimportance with the growth of separate opinions. 
It seems unlikely that many minds are changed as a result of the 
formal conference. Updating Henry Hart's classic (and controver-
sial) 1959 article,s O'Brien concludes that each petition for certio-
rari on the "discuss list" is eligible for six minutes of consideration; 
each case that is set for oral argument can be given about twenty-
nine minutes, or about three minutes per Justice, if they speak 
seriatim. 
Two graphs illustrate the enormous increase in concurring, dis-
senting, and other opinions over the past half-century. In the last 
years of the Hughes Court (1937-40), the Justices produced about 
144 institutional opinions per term and thirty-five concurring, dis-
senting, and separate opinions. From 1969 to 1980 the Burger 
Court averaged 138 institutional opinions and 193 concurrences, 
dissents, and separate opinions. Dissents were up by a multiple of 
ten. According to O'Brien this was due to several factors: individ-
ual opinions are now more highly prized than opinions of the Court; 
the docket now has few easy or uncontroversial cases; there is less 
time for judicial negotiation and bargaining; and there are more law 
clerks. 
O'Brien's final chapter briefly considers the political struggles 
that occur after opinions are handed down. He stresses the impor-
tance of press coverage of the Court, the effect of ambiguity in opin-
ions, and the relevance of public opinion. There is also an 
interesting discussion of the Court's "attentive public," its immedi-
ate constituents: the Solicitor General, Attorney General, and De-
partment of Justice; counsel for federal agencies; states' attorneys 
general; and the legal profession. 
II 
O'Brien's assessment of Chief Justice Burger, for whom he 
worked, can be gleaned from interesting comments in various parts 
of the book. He considers Burger more like Vinson than Warren,6 
noting that, like Vinson, Burger does not have a "legal mind" or a 
"taste for the law" outside the area of criminal procedure. He 
faults Burger for being under-prepared for conference, where he re-
5. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959). 
6. O'Brien thinks Warren was "more than a skilled politician" and that he had "more 
intellectual ability than many critics give him credit for." 
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lied heavily upon his law clerks' memoranda. This very lack of 
forethought allowed him to join a perceived majority, enabling him 
to assign the opinion of the Court. O'Brien also recognizes that, 
despite the Chief's intellectual limitations, the Court in the 1970s 
and 1980s was moving in the direction of Burger's views, especially 
in criminal procedure, his favorite field. 
Burger gets high marks as a court manager. At the end of Earl 
Warren's last term, the Court even lacked a xerox machine, and 
entire days were devoted to the delivery of opinions and the admis-
sion of attorneys to the Court's bar. Burger is credited with bring-
ing "Taft's marble temple into the world of modern technology and 
managerial practices." Thanks to Burger, the Supreme Court 
building has a larger and more diversified workforce, new technol-
ogy, and new, specialized offices. Among the overdue changes 
under Burger was the general limitation on oral argument to thirty 
minutes per side. 
O'Brien gives Justice Powell deserved credit for his leadership 
in expediting the Court's disposition of its caseload. Powell sup-
ported creation of the central legal staff (the two Legal Officers), 
and he suggested the pooling of law clerks to work on petitions for 
certiorari. I would add that Powell persuaded each Justice to use a 
fourth law clerk, and he was a pioneer in using word processing 
equipment in his chambers. 
Storm Center implies that Burger undercut his own leadership 
by not bringing some administrative matters to the conference, in-
cluding his own proposal for an intercircuit tribunal. Furthermore, 
as a result of Burger's unwillingness to bear the burden of screening 
all the unpaid petitions for certiorari, the Chief Justiceship lost the 
central role it had had, since the time of William Howard Taft, in 
dealing with the in forma pauperis petitions. After Burger brought 
the problem to the conference, his colleagues rejected the options of 
either evenly dividing the petitions or employing a revolving panel 
of senior judges to sift them. Instead, they decided that each Justice 
would be responsible for all of the petitions, as they already were 
with paid cases. The added workload was offset by the addition of 
more law clerks and, later, the creation of the "cert pool" by a ma-
jority of the Justices. Essentially, then, responsibility for screening 
paid and unpaid cases passed from the Chief Justice (and his law 
clerks) to the law clerks from all the chambers. 
O'Brien properly credits Burger with "considerable personal 
charm and a good sense of humor," "but also a temper." His opin-
ion of Burger as a "social leader" is that he did "about all he can do 
to promote collegial relations within the Court," which is far more 
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charitable than some recent public comments of Justice Brennan. 
O'Brien concludes that Burger's great accomplishments were in the 
realm of judicial administration, but these are not discussed at any 
length.? 
Professor O'Brien's assessment of the nine Justices as a work-
ing small group makes clear, at least to me, that the nine independ-
ent law firms-the Justices and their clerks-are where most of the 
important work is going on. Discussions among the Justices no 
longer play a central role. Collegiality has diminished as the 
caseload has increased; deliberation now occurs mostly in chambers 
before and after conference. Communication among the Justices 
tends to be written and formal. Truly collective decisionmaking, as 
in the Nixon tapes case, is exceedingly rare, having occurred per-
haps two or three times in the past thirty years. O'Brien concludes: 
The Court now functions more like a legislative body relying simply on a tally of the 
votes to decide cases than like a collegial body working toward collective decisions 
and opinions. 
One consequence of this lack of collegiality, of course, is the 
plethora of individual opinions which may be more highly prized by 
the Justices than opinions of the Court. It was one thing for a Jus-
tice or two to believe that his place in history might be due largely 
to his dissents. It is quite another for most Justices to think that 
their reputation will be determined largely by their concurring opin-
ions, and possibly even by those opinions in which they concur in 
part and dissent in part. Justice Stewart reflected sadly that even 
though the business of the Court is to give institutional opinions, 
"that view has come to be that of a minority of justices." 
III 
Storm Center is based upon considerable archival research. 
The papers of Chief Justices Taft, Hughes, Stone, Vinson, and War-
ren, of Associate Justices Frankfurter (Black, Murphy, Reed, Suth-
erland, and Van Devanter) among others, were culled, as were oral 
histories given by Justices Clark, Marshall, Jackson, and Douglas. 
O'Brien also employed the relevant collections in the Hoover, 
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford Li-
braries. While his research rarely yielded startling insights, there 
are some interesting (and occasionally amusing) pieces of informa-
tion. We learn, for example, that Hugo Black left a note in his pri-
vate papers to " 'correct for posterity any idea about Pres. 
7. For a good discussion, see Tamm & Reardon, Warren E. Burger and the Admin is· 
tration of Justice, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 447-521. 
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Roosevelt's having been fooled about my membership in the 
Klan.'" The Fortas papers yield a strong objection from Potter 
Stewart in 1969 to referring to "what is going on in Vietnam as a 
'war.'" An oral history interview with Felix Frankfurter (who 
comes off badly in this book, as he has in much recent scholarship) 
yielded this gem, although readers may differ as to whether it 
reveals more about Robert F. Kennedy, Arthur Goldberg, or 
Frankfurter himself: 
What does Bobby understand about the Supreme Court? He understands about as 
much about it as you understand about the undiscovered 76th star in the galaxy .... 
He said Arthur Goldberg was a scholarly lawyer. I wonder where he got that no-
tion from. 
We also learn that Charles Evans Hughes permitted FDR to run a 
telephone line from the White House to the Court in order to learn 
immediately the Court's decision in the Gold Clause cases, and that 
Justices Brennan and Marshall have programmed the computer sys-
tem in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to print auto-
matically all dissents from denials of certiorari where capital 
punishment is involved. 
Storm Center contains thirteen tables and charts, several of 
which are very valuable. One table, for example, lists all major leg-
islation affecting the jurisdiction and business of the Court since 
1789. O'Brien updates the work of Frankfurter and Landis and Eu-
gene Gressman in another table, providing the number of cases by 
subject matter (twenty categories) over various intervals from 1825 
to 1980. In another table he compares the average number of dis-
sents per term of "great dissenters" from William Johnson to the 
second Justice Harlan with the members of the Burger Court. 
Occasionally, O'Brien gives an incomplete picture because he 
relied too much upon primary sources. He discovered in papers of 
the Truman Library that the Truman administration considered 
nominating Florence Allen as the first female Justice, but O'Brien 
missed the far more important campaign for Allen's elevation dur-
ing the Roosevelt administration, a story chronicled by Beverly 
Blair Cook. s 
I was frustrated only in those few places where O'Brien's reve-
lations were not footnoted in sufficient detail to permit a clear idea 
of their basis without undertaking a trip to a presidential (or other) 
library. Among these is the statement that Charles Evans Hughes 
was "notoriously inclined to keep the best opinions for himself"; 
that Cardozo strongly disapproved of Hughes's Court-packing let-
8. Cook, The First Woman Candidate/or the Supreme Court-Florence E. Allen, 1981 
Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'y 19. 
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ter and would have refused to sign it; and that Stone cultivated 
FDR and offered advice "even on the Department of Justice's strat-
egies and conduct of criminal prosecutions." 
IV 
Storm Center is one of the best books on the Court published 
for the general public since Anthony Lewis's classic, Gideon's 
Trumpet. It is far more reliable, though less fun, than The Breth-
ren. While it lacks the literary felicity and penetration of John P. 
Frank's Marble Palace, that book is out-of-date and out-of-print. 
Bernard Schwartz's Super Chief, a history of the Warren Court, was 
a brilliant contribution to our knowledge of the inner workings of 
the Court, but its 772 densely packed pages tell more about the pen-
guins than even the penguin keepers would want to know! Its popu-
lar spinoff was not a very good book. 
Storm Center is particularly well-suited for use in upperclass 
undergraduate courses in political science dealing with constitu-
tional law and the Supreme Court. Its appearance is most timely, as 
the best short history of the Court is twenty-seven years old;9 the 
only volume with more than four case studies deals with no case 
beyond 1954;10 and the one collection of biographical sketches of 
the Justices is now out-of-print.! I 
What we do have available are well- executed but dry paper-
back texts, focusing largely upon the selection of Justices, gate keep-
ing, decisionmaking, and decisional outputs; 12 others considering 
the federal court system as a whole, with separate chapters on the 
Supreme Court; 13 and still others treating both the federal and state 
judicial systems.14 An instructor might choose to assign any of sev-
eral fine anthologies focusing on constitutional interpretation, 1s or 
concentrating more broadly on the judicial process.16 Finally, one 
may assign more specialized books about the appointment of Jus-
tices and their characteristics, 11 the Reagan administration and the 
9. R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960). 
10. QUARRELS THAT SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION {J. Garraty ed. 1964). 
II. A. DUNHAM & P. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE {rev. ed. 1964). 
12. E.g., L. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT {2d ed. 1985); S. WASBY, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM {2d ed. 1984). 
13. H. BALL, COURTS AND POLITICS: THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1987); 
R. CARP & R. STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS {1985); S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE. THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM {3d ed. 1985). 
14. E.g., H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (5th ed. 1986); L. BAU~, AMERICAN 
CoURTS (1986). 
15. E.g., M. CANNON & D. O'BRIEN, VIEWS FROM THE BENCH (1985). 
16. E.g., W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES & POLITICS (4th ed. 1986). 
17. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS (2d ed. 1985). 
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Court,Is or the Court's procedures and customs.I9 Storm Center 
offers the alternative of a readable, reliable, up-to-date, general book 
on the High Court. College and law school professors take note. 
I regret the necessity of adding one unpleasant fact: the bind-
ing of my hardcover copy was exceedingly flimsy. Caveat emptor. 
SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 
Edited by Robert A. Goldwin1 and Art Kaufman.2 Washing-
ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research. 
1986. Pp. xi, 193. Cloth, $21.50; paper, $11.00. 
Frank J. Sorauf3 
I confess that I would have abandoned this volume somewhere 
in midstream had I not committed myself to review it. As it turned 
out, that would have been a mistake. I would have missed the final 
essay, a gem by James Ceaser, which rebuts much of the formalism 
and reformism of the previous essays. 
The problems begin with the title. Most of the eight essays in 
the book do not really answer the question it poses: does the sepa-
ration of powers still work? Rather, we have here a poorly joined 
debate about whether the American political system suffers from 
deadlock and whether, since the deadlock results from the separa-
tion of powers, constitutional changes are necessary. It is an 
argument that has been floating around for some time but that has 
been given a new immediacy and audience-or funding-by the Bi-
centennial. The real subject is perceived policy-making deadlock 
and political fragmentation in American government. A systematic 
analysis of the separation of powers in contemporary American 
policymaking is nowhere in sight. 
By now the protagonists are familiar. Lloyd N. Cutler, Wash-
ington lawyer and member of the Carter administration, opens the 
volume with an adaptation of an academic lecture that had ap-
peared in Foreign Affairs in 1980. Noting the difficulty of assem-
bling congressional majorities behind coherent programs (which, it 
18. E. WITI, A DIFFERENT JUSTICE: REAGAN AND THE SUPREME COURT (1986). 
19. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSTICES (1979). 
I. Resident scholar and director of constitutional studies at the American Enterprise 
Institute. 
2. Acting director of education programs at the Commission on the Bicentennial of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
3. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
